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NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary print of the United States Reports.  Readers are requested to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
ington, D.C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that
corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
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No. 92-1750
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JOHN C. FOGERTY, PETITIONER v.
FANTASY, INC.
on writ of certiorari to the united states court
of appeals for the ninth circuit
[March 1, 1994]

  Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the
Court.
  The Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U. S. C. 505, provides
in relevant part that in any copyright infringement
action -the court may . . . award a reasonable attorney's
fee to the prevailing party as part of the costs.-  The
question presented in this case is what standards should
inform a court's decision to award attorney's fees to a
prevailing defendant in a copyright infringement ac-
tion-a question that has produced conflicting views in
the Courts of Appeals.
  Petitioner John Fogerty is a successful musician, who,
in the late 1960's, was the lead singer and songwriter of
a popular music group known as -Creedence Clearwater
Revival.-  In 1970, he wrote a song entitled -Run
Through the Jungle- and sold the exclusive publishing
rights to predecessors-in-interest of respondent Fantasy,
Inc., who later obtained the copyright by assignment.
The music group disbanded in 1972 and Fogerty subse-
quently published under another recording label.  In
1985, he published and registered a copyright to a song
entitled -The Old Man Down the Road,- which was
released on an album distributed by Warner Brothers
Records, Inc.  Respondent Fantasy, Inc., sued Fogerty,
Warner Brothers, and affiliated companies, in District
Court, alleging that -The Old Man Down the Road- was
merely -Run Through the Jungle- with new words.
The copyright infringement claim went to trial and a
jury returned a verdict in favor of Fogerty.
  After his successful defense of the action, Fogerty
moved for reasonable attorney's fees pursuant to 17
U. S. C. 505.  The District Court denied the motion,
finding that Fantasy's infringement suit was not brought
frivolously or in bad faith as required by circuit prece-
dent for an award of attorney's fees to a successful
defendant.  The Court of Appeals affirmed, 984 F. 2d
1524 (CA9 1993), and declined to abandon the existing
Ninth Circuit standard for awarding attorney's fees
which treats successful plaintiffs and successful defend-
ants differently.  Under that standard, commonly termed
the -dual- standard, prevailing plaintiffs are generally
awarded attorney's fees as a matter of course, while
prevailing defendants must show that the original suit
was frivolous or brought in bad faith.  In contrast,
some courts of appeals follow the so-called -evenhanded-
approach in which no distinction is made between
prevailing plaintiffs and prevailing defendants.  The
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, for example, has
ruled that -we do not require bad faith, nor do we
mandate an allowance of fees as a concomitant of
prevailing in every case, but we do favor an evenhanded
approach.-  Lieb v. Topstone Industries, Inc., 788 F. 2d
151, 156 (CA3 1986).
  We granted certiorari, 509 U. S. ___ (1993), to address
an important area of federal law and to resolve the
conflict between the Ninth Circuit's -dual- standard for
awarding attorney's fees under 505, and the so-called
-evenhanded- approach exemplified by the Third Cir-
cuit.  We reverse.
  Respondent advances three arguments in support of
the dual standard followed by the Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit in this case.  First, it contends that
the language of 505, when read in the light of our
decisions construing similar fee-shifting language,
supports the rule.  Second, it asserts that treating
prevailing plaintiffs and defendants differently comports
with the -objectives- and -equitable considerations-
underlying the Copyright Act as a whole.  Finally,
respondent contends that the legislative history of 505
indicates that Congress ratified the dual standard which
it claims was -uniformly- followed by the lower courts
under identical language in the 1909 Copyright Act.  We
address each of these arguments in turn.
  The statutory language--the court may also award a
reasonable attorney's fee to the prevailing party as part
of the costs--gives no hint that successful plaintiffs are
to be treated differently than successful defendants.  But
respondent contends that our decision in Christiansburg
Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U. S. 412 (1978), in which
we construed virtually identical language, supports a
differentiation in treatment between plaintiffs and
defendants.
  Christiansburg construed the language of Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which in relevant part
provided that the court -in its discretion, may allow the
prevailing party . . . a reasonable attorney's fee as part
of the costs . . . .-  42 U. S. C. 2000e-5(k).  We had
earlier held, interpreting the cognate provision of Title
II of that Act, 42 U. S. C. 2000a-3(b), that a prevailing
plaintiff -should ordinarily recover an attorney's fee
unless some special circumstances would render such an
award unjust.-  Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc.,
390 U. S. 400, 402 (1968).  This decision was based on
what we found to be the important policy objectives of
the Civil Rights statutes, and the intent of Congress to
achieve such objectives through the use of plaintiffs as
-`private attorney[s] general.'-  Ibid.  In Christiansburg,
supra, we determined that the same policy consider-
ations were not at work in the case of a prevailing civil
rights defendant.  We noted that a Title VII plaintiff,
like a Title II plaintiff in Piggie Park, is -the chosen
instrument of Congress to vindicate `a policy that
Congress considered of the highest priority.'-  434 U. S.,
at 418.  We also relied on the admittedly sparse legisla-
tive history to indicate that different standards were to
be applied to successful plaintiffs than to successful
defendants.
  Respondent points to our language in Flight Attend-
ants v. Zipes, 491 U. S. 754, 758, n. 2 (1989), that -fee-
shifting statutes' similar language is a `strong indication'
that they are to be interpreted alike.-  But here we
think this normal indication is overborne by the factors
relied upon in our Christiansburg opinion which are
absent in the case of the Copyright Act.  The legisla-
tive history of 505 provides no support for treating
prevailing plaintiffs and defendants differently with
respect to the recovery of attorney's fees.  The attorney's
fees provision 505 of the 1976 Act was carried forward
verbatim from the 1909 Act with very little discus-
sion.  The relevant House Report provides simply:

-Under section 505 the awarding of costs and
attorney's fees are left to the court's discretion, and
the section also makes clear that neither costs nor
attorney's fees can be awarded to or against `the
United States or an officer thereof.'-  H. R. Rep. No.
94-1476, p. 163 (1976).

See also, S. Rep. No. 94-473, p. 145 (1975) (same).
Other courts and commentators have noted the paucity
of legislative history of 505.  See, e. g., Cohen v.
Virginia Electric & Power Co., 617 F. Supp. 619, 621
(ED Va. 1985), aff'd on other grounds, 788 F. 2d 247
(CA4 1986).  See also Jaszi, 505 And All That-The
Defendant's Dilemma, 55 Law & Contemp. Prob. 107,
107-108, and nn. 1, 2 (1992).
  The goals and objectives of the two Acts are likewise
not completely similar.  Oftentimes, in the civil rights
context, impecunious -private attorney general- plaintiffs
can ill afford to litigate their claims against defendants
with more resources.  Congress sought to redress this
balance in part, and to provide incentives for the
bringing of meritorious lawsuits, by treating successful
plaintiffs more favorably than successful defendants in
terms of the award of attorney's fees.  The primary
objective of the Copyright Act is to encourage the
production of original literary, artistic, and musical
expression for the good of the public.  See, infra, at
9-10.  In the copyright context, it has been noted that
-[e]ntities which sue for copyright infringement as
plaintiffs can run the gamut from corporate behemoths
to starving artists; the same is true of prospective
copyright infringement defendants.-  Cohen, supra, at
622-623.
  We thus conclude that respondent's argument based on
our fee-shifting decisions under the Civil Rights Act
must fail.
  Respondent next argues that the policies and objec-
tives of 505 and of the Copyright Act in general are
best served by the -dual approach- to the award of
attorney's fees.  The most common reason advanced
in support of the dual approach is that, by awarding
attorney's fees to prevailing plaintiffs as a matter of
course, it encourages litigation of meritorious claims of
copyright infringement.  See, e. g., McCulloch v. Albert
E. Price, Inc., 823 F. 2d 316, 323 (CA9 1987) (-[b]ecause
section 505 is intended in part to encourage the asser-
tion of colorable copyright claims, to deter infringement,
and to make the plaintiff whole, fees are generally
awarded to a prevailing plaintiff-) (citations omitted);
Diamond v. Am-Law Publishing Corp., 745 F. 2d 142,
148 (CA2 1984) (same).  Indeed, respondent relies
heavily on this argument.  We think the argument is
flawed because it expresses a one-sided view of the
purposes of the Copyright Act.  While it is true that one
of the goals of the Copyright Act is to discourage
infringement, it is by no means the only goal of that
Act.  In the first place, it is by no means always the
case that the plaintiff in an infringement action is the
only holder of a copyright; often times, defendants hold
copyrights too, as exemplified in the case at hand.  See,
Lieb v. Topstone Industries, Inc., 788 F. 2d, at 155
(noting that -in many cases the defendants are the
[copyright] holders-).
  More importantly, the policies served by the Copyright
Act are more complex, more measured, than simply
maximizing the number of meritorious suits for copyright
infringement.  The Constitution grants to Congress the
power -To promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writ-
ings and Discoveries.-  U. S. Const., Art. I, 8, cl. 8.
We have often recognized the monopoly privileges that
Congress has authorized, while -intended to motivate the
creative activity of authors and inventors by the provi-
sion of a special reward,- are limited in nature and
must ultimately serve the public good.  Sony Corp. of
America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U. S. 417,
429 (1984).  For example, in Twentieth Century Music
Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U. S. 151, 156 (1975), we discussed
the policies underlying the 1909 Copyright Act as
follows:
      -The limited scope of the copyright holder's
statutory monopoly . . . reflects a balance of compet-
ing claims upon the public interest: Creative work is
to be encouraged and rewarded, but private motiva-
tion must ultimately serve the cause of promoting
broad public availability of literature, music, and the
other arts.  The immediate effect of our copyright
law is to secure a fair return for an `author's'
creative labor.  But the ultimate aim is, by this
incentive, to stimulate artistic creativity for the
general public good.-  (Footnotes omitted.)

We reiterated this theme in Feist Publications, Inc. v.
Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 U. S. 340, 349-350
(1991), where we said:
-The primary objective of copyright is not to reward
the labor of authors, but `[t]o promote the Progress
of Science and useful Arts.'  To this end, copyright
assures authors the right to their original expres-
sion, but encourages others to build freely upon the
ideas and information conveyed by a work.-  (Cita-
tions omitted.)
  Because copyright law ultimately serves the purpose
of enriching the general public through access to creative
works, it is peculiarly important that the boundaries of
copyright law be demarcated as clearly as possible.  To
that end, defendants who seek to advance a variety of
meritorious copyright defenses should be encouraged to
litigate them to the same extent that plaintiffs are
encouraged to litigate meritorious claims of infringement.
In the case before us, the successful defense of -The Old
Man Down the Road- increased public exposure to a
musical work that could, as a result, lead to further
creative pieces.  Thus a successful defense of a copyright
infringement action may further the policies of the
Copyright Act every bit as much as a successful prosecu-
tion of an infringement claim by the holder of a copy-
right.
  Respondent finally urges that the legislative history
supports the dual standard, relying on the principle of
ratification.  See, Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U. S. 575, 580
(1978) (-Congress is presumed to be aware of an admin-
istrative or judicial interpretation of a statute and to
adopt that interpretation when it re-enacts a statute
without change . . .-).  Respondent surveys the great
number of lower court cases interpreting the identical

provision in the 1909 Act, 17 U. S. C. 116 (1976 ed.),
and asserts that -it was firmly established- that prevail-
ing defendants should be awarded attorney's fees only
where the plaintiff's claim was frivolous or brought with
a vexatious purpose.  Brief for Respondent 40-45.
Furthermore, respondent claims that Congress was
aware of this construction of former 116 because of two
Copyright Studies submitted to Congress when studying
revisions to the Act.  W. Strauss, Damage Provisions of
the Copyright Law, Study No. 22 (hereinafter Strauss
Study), and R. Brown, Operation of the Damage Provi-
sions of the Copyright Law: An Exploratory Study, Study
No. 23 (hereinafter Brown Study), Studies Prepared for
Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights,
86th Cong., 2d Sess. (H. Judiciary Comm. Print 1960).
  Before turning to the import of the two studies and
the cases decided under the 1909 Act, we summarize
briefly the factual background of Lorillard, whence
comes the statement upon which respondents rely.
There the question was whether there was a right to
jury trial in an action for lost wages under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) of 1967.  In
enacting that statute, Congress provided, inter alia, that
the provisions of the ADEA were to be -enforced in
accordance with the `powers, remedies and procedures'-
of specified sections of the Fair Labor Standards Act
(FLSA), 81 Stat. 604, 29 U. S. C. 626(b).  Lorillard,
434 U. S., at 580.  In the three decided cases which had
treated the right to jury trial under the FLSA, each
court had decided that there was such a right.  In
enacting the ADEA, -Congress exhibited both a detailed
knowledge of the FLSA provisions and their judicial
interpretation and a willingness to depart from those
provisions regarded as undesirable or inappropriate for
incorporation.-  Id., at 581.
  Here, by contrast, the Strauss and Brown Copyright
Studies deal only briefly with the provision for the
award of attorney's fees.  In the Strauss Study, the
limited discussion begins with a quote to A. Weil,
American Copyright Law 530-531 (1917) for an explana-
tion of the -discretionary awarding of attorney's fees-:
-`The amount of money frequently involved in copy-
right letigation [sic], especially on the part of the
defendant is trifling.  The expense of any letigation
[sic] is considerable.  Unless, therefore, some provi-
sion is made for financial protection to a litigant, if
successful, it may not pay a party to defend rights,
even if valid, a situation opposed to justice . . . .  It
is increasingly recognized that the person who forces
another to engage counsel to vindicate, or defend, a
right should bear the expense of such engagement
and not his successful opponent . . . .'-  Strauss
Study 31.
The study then notes that the pending bills contemplate
no change in the attorney's fees provision and concludes
with the simple statement -[t]he cases indicate that
this discretion has been judiciously exercised by the
courts.-  Ibid.  This limited discussion of attorney's
fees surely does not constitute an endorsement of a dual
standard.
  The Brown Study was intended as a supplement to
the Strauss Study and, inter alia, provides information
from a survey distributed to practitioners about the
practical workings of the 1909 Copyright Act.  It also
does not endorse a standard of treating prevailing
plaintiffs and defendants differently.  At one point, the
study notes that -courts do not usually make an allow-
ance at all if an unsuccessful plaintiff's claim was not
`synthetic, capricious or otherwise unreasonable,' or if
the losing defendant raised real issues of fact or law.-
Brown Study 85.
  Our review of the prior case law itself leads us to
conclude that there was no settled -dual standard-
interpretation of former 116 about which Congress
could have been aware.  We note initially that at least
one reported case stated no reason in awarding
attorney's fees to successful defendants.  See, e. g.,
Marks v. Leo Feist, Inc., 8 F. 2d 460, 461 (CA2 1925)
(noting that the Copyright Act gave courts -absolute
discretion,- the court awarded attorney's fees to prevail-
ing defendant after plaintiff voluntarily dismissed suit).
More importantly, while it appears that the majority of
lower courts exercised their discretion in awarding
attorney's fees to prevailing defendants based on a
finding of frivolousness or bad faith, not all courts
expressly described the test in those terms.  In fact,
only one pre-1976 case expressly endorsed a dual
standard.  Breffort v. I Had a Ball Co., 271 F. Supp.
623 (SDNY 1967).  This is hardly the sort of uniform
construction which Congress might have endorsed.
  In summary, neither of the two studies presented to
Congress, nor the cases referred to by the studies,
support respondent's view that there was a settled
construction in favor of the -dual standard- under 116
of the 1909 Copyright Act.
  We thus reject each of respondent's three arguments
in support of the dual standard.  We now turn to
petitioner's argument that 505 was intended to adopt
the -British Rule.-  Petitioner argues that, consistent
with the neutral language of 505, both prevailing
plaintiffs and defendants should be awarded attorney's
fees as a matter of course, absent exceptional circum-
stances.  For two reasons we reject this argument for
the British Rule.
  First, just as the plain language of 505 supports
petitioner's claim for disapproving the dual standard, it
cuts against him in arguing for the British Rule.  The
statute says that -the court may also award a reason-
able attorney's fee to the prevailing party as part of the
costs.-  The word -may- clearly connotes discretion.  The
automatic awarding of attorney's fees to the prevailing
party would pretermit the exercise of that discretion.
  Second, we are mindful that Congress legislates
against the strong background of the American Rule.
Unlike Britain where counsel fees are regularly awarded
to the prevailing party, it is the general rule in this
country that unless Congress provides otherwise, parties
are to bear their own attorney's fees.  Alyeska Pipeline
Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U. S. 240, 247-262 (1975)
(tracing the origins and development of the American
Rule); Flight Attendants v. Zipes, 491 U. S., at 758.
While 505 is one situation in which Congress has
modified the American Rule to allow an award of
attorney's fees in the court's discretion, we find it
impossible to believe that Congress, without more,
intended to adopt the British Rule.  Such a bold depar-
ture from traditional practice would have surely drawn
more explicit statutory language and legislative com-
ment.  Cf., Isbrandtsen Co. v. Johnson, 343 U. S. 779,
783 (1952) (-Statutes which invade the common law . . .
are to be read with a presumption favoring the retention
of long-established and familiar principles, except when
a statutory purpose to the contrary is evident-).  Not
surprisingly, no court has held that 505 (or its prede-
cessor statute) adopted the British Rule.
  Thus we reject both the -dual standard- adopted by
several of the Courts of Appeals, and petitioner's claim
that 505 enacted the British Rule for automatic
recovery of attorney's fees by the prevailing party.
Prevailing plaintiffs and prevailing defendants are to be
treated alike, but attorney's fees are to be awarded to
prevailing parties only as a matter of the court's
discretion.  -There is no precise rule or formula for
making these determinations,- but instead equitable
discretion should be exercised -in light of the consider-
ations we have identified.-  Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461
U. S. 424, 436-437 (1983).  Because the Court of
Appeals erroneously held petitioner, the prevailing
defendant, to a more stringent standard than that
applicable to a prevailing plaintiff, its judgment is
reversed and the case is remanded for further proceed-
ings consistent with this opinion.
                                      It is so ordered.